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ABSTRACT: On 3 August 1996, the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission Act became law and established the nine-member Na-
tional Gambling Impact Study Commission. Passed by unanimous 
voice vote in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, the 
gambling commission was the congressional response to a gambling 
industry whose influence threatened to overwhelm not only state and 
local governmental decision making but also the objectivity of the 
court system via test cases to expand gambling. This article examines 
the potential influence of the gambling industry and its lobbyists. 
There exist significant congressional fears that the gambling indus-
try could be sufficiently powerful to change U.S. policy and the 
economy (locally, regionally, and nationally). 
John Kindt is a professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where 
he . has taught commerce and legal politY courses since 1978: He has held several 
positions in state and federal government. He has also been.a,· senior fellow at the 
London School of Economics. He has written over 30 articles i~ the. areas of licensed 
organized gambling's economic impacts, antitrust law, tax law., commercial law, 
environmental law. and public and private international law. , 
NOTE: Due· to the editorial format of this publication, multiple citations documenting the 
same point have been deleted. 
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S INCE the Watergate era, when investigative reporters were ad-
vised to "follow the money" to find the 
facts, this principle has been reaf-
firmed several times as the mecha-
nism for the fourth estate to scourge 
crime and corruption from govern-
ment, lobbying activities, and the po-
litical process (Bernstein and Wood-
ward 1975, 35). Gambling industry 
lobbyists, however, successfully lob-
bied Congress to limit the subpoena 
power in the 1996 National Gam-
bling Impact Study Commission Act 
(Pub. L 104-169) to cover only docu-
ments and not people. Even so, the 
1996 commission's power to sub-
poena documents may still reveal 
some unflattering problems with 
U.S. legalized gambling, such as in-
creased crime and corruption (Glenn 
et al. 1996, S7976). 
THE POWER OF MONEY 
the U.S. political process. During the 
1990s, the gambling industry quickly 
became the single most powerful lob-
bying group in many state legisla-
tures (Goodman 1995a, 190). In Illi-
nois, for example, one casino 
company offered $20 million to two 
political insiders to help secure a ca-
sino license (Drinkard 1996, 7). In 
1995 in VIrginia, a state with only 
some charitable gambling and a re-
cently enacted lottery, casino propo-
nents hired 48 lobbyists who repre-
sented practically every lobbying 
finn in the state capital in an attempt 
to prohibit any antigambling lobby-
ists from competing. The pro-casino 
interests then spent $820,000 to $1.1 
million during a 45-day legislative 
session in a failed attempt to legalize 
riverboat casinos (U.S. House 1995, 
19; Snider 1995, 3336). 
In congressional hearings before 
the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary, Repre-
Money is power, and absolute sentative Frank R. Wolf indicated his 
money is absolute power. However, as concern "that the flood of casino 
Lord Acton codified in 1887, "power money into the states . . . [would] 
tends to corrupt and absolute power drown out the voices of ordinary citi-
corrupts absolutely." The organized zens, and overwhelm state public of-
gambling industry absorbs substan- ficials" (U.S. House 1995, 19). Simul-
tial monetary resources from the taneously, similar concerns were 
populations where gambling activi- raised that "the extraordinary 
ties are conducted (U.S. House 1994, amount of money which ... [was] le-
5-10; Florida Governor's Office 1994, gally used to overwhelm any opposi-
79). In Mississippi, for example,' tion ... [would lead] to unbalanced 
"gamblers bet $30 billion ... [in 1994, ,decisionm~g processes by elected 
which was] more than the state's total" officials, regulatory' agencies, and 
taxable retail sales" (Hornblower even the court system" (U.S. House 
1996,31; U.S. House 1995,20).Approxi- 1995, 520). 
mately 10 percent Qf the amount wa- "Money" and "power" appeared to 
gered is lost to the gambling operators. be recurrent themes and goals within 
By -1995, 'the mQnetary resources the gambling industry. These themes! 
of licensed organized gambling were extemporized and summarized 
threatened to 'Corrupt and' unhinge by the author of the u.s. Gambling 
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Study, Professor Robert Goodman, 
during his speech to the 1995 Annual 
Convention of the National Coalition 
Against Legalized Gambling 
(NCALG): 
This is not an issue . . . of the states 
versus the federal government [as the 
gambling industry argues]. It is simply 
an issue of an industry that can buy poli-
ticians, that has more power than most 
other industries, that operates on a na-
tional and international level, and [that] 
is trying to expand gambling to every-
where in the United States. It is as simple 
as that. (Goodman 1995b) 
Lulled by the historical illegality of 
gambling activities since 1910, the 
U.S. public needed to be reac-
quainted with the increased crime 
and socioeconomic negatives associ-
ated with legalized gambling activi-
ties (U.S. House 1994, 77). 
Leading this informational pro-
cess in 1994 was Walter Cronkite, 
who challenged the economic claims 
of the U.S. gambling industry as "per-
haps the most cynical promotion ever 
perpetrated on the American people" 
(Cronkite 1994, 1). Echoing Professor 
Goodman, Cronkite raised ethical is-
sues involving governmental ex-
cesses that were unopposed due to 
the "near collapse of moral resistance 
to organized gambling" caused by 
years of charitable gambling in 
churches to raise money (Cronkite 
1994, 11). Referencing P. T. Barnum's 
famous observation that "there's a 
sucker bom every minute," Cronkite 
concluded that the greatest problem 
was "the collapse of America's work 
ethic in the sybaritic philosophy that 
you can get something for nothing" 
(Cronkite 1994, 1, 11). 
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The unlimited amounts of money 
available to the gambling industry 
would also corrupt the governmental 
system according to Nat Helms, a 
former high-ranking member of the 
gambling industry's 1994 campaign 
that brought video gambling ma-
chines to Missouri. 
"Because of the unlimited money it gen-
erates, gambling also generates unlim-
ited potential for abuse," said Helms, who 
has since soured on his former employers 
and ... [written] a yet-unpublished book 
on the Missouri campaign. "I never met 
anybody who could resist a full-court 
press by the gambling industry." 
(Drinkard 1996, 7) 
The cynicism displayed by this for-
mer member of the gambling indus-
try's political team suggested that 
the industry's philosophy was that 
everyone and everything had a price. 
By 15 October 1996, the data of the 
Federal Election Commission, as re-
ported by the Center for Responsive 
Politics and the NCALG (1997), re-
vealed that in 1996, gambling inter-
~sts doubled their contributions to 
federal candidates to total $4.4 mil-
lion, including $2.6 million in soft 
money (Hom 1996, 1) (see Table 1). 
The news media opined that these 
contributions were to counter and/or 
influence the federal appointments 
to the 1996 gambling commission 
(Harden 1996). By the end of the 1996 
election cycle, these totals had 
reached $5.4 million, including $3.6 
million in soft money, which was tri-
ple the amount contributed in the 
1993-94 election cycle and a 700 per-
cent increase ,over the $457,600 con-
tributed in 1991-92 (Hom 1997b, 1) 
(see Tables 1 and 2). During 1996, the 
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TABLE 1 
TOP 15 SOFT-MONEY CONTRIBUTORS FROM THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY: 
1995·96 ELECnON CYCLE TOTALS 
American Gaming Association, Washington, D.C. 
Bally's, Chicago (C) 
Boyd Gaming Corporation, Las Vegas (C) 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Indio, CA (T) 
Circus Circus Enterprises, Las Vegas (C) 
GTech Corporation, West Greenwich, RI (C) 
Harrah's, Memphis, TN (C) 
International Game Technology, Reno, NV (C) 
Mashantucket Pequot Nation, Ledyard, CT (T) 
Mirage Resorts, Las Vegas (C) 












Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, UncaSville, CT (T) 
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, Oneida, WI (T) 


























Marie, MI (T) 
Tracinda Corporation, Las Vegas (C) 
Trump Casino Resorts, Atlantic City (C) 
Total, 15 top soft-money gambling donors 










$1,4n,995 $1,217,375 $2,695,370 
$1,687,445 $1,968,575 $3,656,020 
SOURCE: Federal Election Commission data, as compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics 
and the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling (1997). 
NOTE: M(C)" stands for Mcommerciar; M(T}" for 'ribaJ." 
American Gaming Association (AGA) 
reported spending $860,000 on fed-
erallobbying, including $232,000 on 
outside lobbyists, in efforts to stack 
the 1996 gambling commission-ac-
cordi.l;lg to gambling opponents (Horn 
1997a,I). 
Furthermore, the gambling indus-
try was engaging ili$10 million cam-
paigns to legalize various gambling 
activities on a state-by-state basis. 
The industry spent, for example, 
$16.5 million in a 1994 campaign to 
legalize casinos in Florida-which 
was more than was spent on the 1994 
gubernatorial campaigns of Gover-
nor Lawton Chiles and his challenger 
Jeb Bush combined (Lavelle 1994, 1). 
In the five years preceding ,1!;)97, 
gambling interests contributed 
"more than $100 million in political 
donations [including campaigns to le-
galize casinos] at the state level" 
(Lynch 1997,38) .. 
By comparison, those citizen 
groups that ran informational cam-
paigns against proposals for ex-
panded gambling claimed that if they 
could raise $1 for every $75 spent by 
gambling interests, the gambling in-
terests would lose. Thus, by 1994, the 
1:75 ratio became the break-even 
point for those citizen groups funding 
informational campaigns (Zabilka 
1994,3). . 
Govern.ments, however, still en-
couraged their citizens to be losers, 
and citizens lost approximately $50 
billion in 1996 to organized gambling 
activities licensed and sponsored by 
governments. Several statesmen, in-
cluding U.S. Senator Richard Lu~ar. 
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TABLE 2 
MAJOR SOFT-MONEY CONTRIBUTORS FROM THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY: 
1995-96 ELECTION CYCLE TOTALS 
Summary 
Total to Republicans: 
Total to Democrats: 
Total to both: 1995-96 
1993-94 
1991-92 
Total by commercial gambling companies: 
Total by tribal gambling interests: 
Total to Republicans by commercial gambling: 
Total to Republicans by tribal gambling: 
Total to Democrats by commercial gambling: 












To Republicans To Democrats Total 
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Palm Springs, 
CA(T) $0 $15,000 $15,000 
Aladdin Hotel & Casino, Inc., las Vegas (C) $0 $2,000 $2,000 
Alliance Gaming Corporation, Las Vegas (C) $10,000 $12,000 $22,000 
American Gaming Association, Washington, D.C. (C) $34,850 $35,250 $70,100 
Aztar Corporation, Phoenix, IV. (C) $10,000 $10,000 $20,000 
Bally's, Chicago (C) $27,000 $130,000 $157,000 
Barona Casino & Bingo, lakeside, CA (T) $0 $22,000 $22,000 
Bayard Raceways, Inc., Jacksonville, Fl (C) $0 $5,500 $5,500 
Boardwalk Casino, Inc., las Vegas (C) $0 $1,000 $1,000 
Boomtown, Inc., Verdi, NV (C) $11,500 $50,000 $61,500 
Boyd Gaming Corporation, las Vegas (C) $n,500 $65,000 $142,500 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Indio, CA (T) $0 $107,000 $107,000 
Cache Creek Indian Bingo, Brooks, CA (T) $0 $12,500 $12,500 
Camel Rock Casino, Santa Fe, NM (T) $0 $5,000 $5,000 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Eagle Butte, SO (T) $0 $200 $200 
Chitimacha Tribe of louisiana, Charenton, LA (T) $0 $1,500 $1,500 
Circus Circus Enterprises, las Vegas (C) $165,000 $90,000 $255,000 
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, Plummer, 10 (T) $0 $1,000 $1,000 
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, Grand Ronde, 
OR(T) $0 $1,000 $1,000 
Crow Bar & Casino lounge, Sioux Falls, SO (T) $250 $0 $250 
Delaware North Companies, Buffalo, NY (C) $15,000 $0 $15,000 
GTech Corporation, West Greenwich, RI (C) $150,000 $20,000 $170,000 
Gaming Solutions Intemational, Highland Ranch, CO (C) , $1,600 $0 $1,600 
Gold Coast, Las Vegas (C) $10,000 $0 $10,000 
Grand Casinos Mille lacs, Plymouth, MN (T) $23,000 $15,000 $38,000 
Harrah's, MemphiS, TN (C) $79,545 $50,000 $129,545 
Hilton Gaming, las Vegas (C) $0 $25,000 $25,000 
Hollywood Park, Inglewood, CA (C) $10,000 $0 $10,000 
Horseshoe Casino & Hot~l, Robinsonville, MS (C) $5,000 $0 $5,000 
Inland Casino Corporation, La Jolla, CA (C) $24,850 $10,000 $34,850 
International Game Technology, Reno, NV (C) $161,600 $55,000 $216,600 
Jackson Rancheria, Jackson, CA (T) $0 $12,500 $12,500 
(continued) 
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TABLE 2 Continued 
To Republicans To Democrats Total 
lac Vieux Desert Tribal Operations, Watersmeet, MI (T) $250 $0 $250 
lady Luck Rhythm & Blues Casino, lula, MS (C) $12,500 $0 $12,500 
los Alamitos Race Course, los Alamitos, CA (C) $10,000 $0 $10,000 
MGM Grand, Inc., las Vegas (C) $30,000 $40,000 $70,000 
Mashantucket Pequot Nation, ledyard, CT (T) $90,000 $319,625 $409,625 
Miccosukee Indian Bingo & Gaming, Miami, Fl (T) $13,000 $0 $13,000 
Mikohn Gaming Association, las Vegas (C) $0 $2,500 $2,500 
Mirage Resorts, las Vegas (C) $251,500 $35,000 $286,500 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Philadelphia, 
MS (T) $15,000 $30,000 $45,000 
Mississippi Gaming lP, Biloxi, MS (C) $250 $0 $250 
Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, Uncasville, CT (T) $50,000 $50,000 $100,000 
Muckleshoot Indian tribe, Auburn, WA (T) $0 $39,500 $39,500 
New Mexico Indian Gaming Association, Santa Fe, NM (T) $0 $2,500 $2,500 
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, Oneida, WI (T) $0 $103,000 $103,000 
Polo Towers, las Vegas (C) $0 $15,000 $15,000 
Pueblo of Pojoaque, Santa Fe, NM (T) $0 $17,750 $17,750 
Pueblo of Sandia, Bernalillo, NM (T) $1,500 $7,500 $9,000 
Pueblo of Santa Ana, Bernalillo, NM (T) $0 $12,500 $12,500 
Pueblo of Tesuque, Santa Fe, NM (T) $0 $45,000 $45,000 
Puyallup Tribe of Indians, Tacoma, WA (T) $0 $30,000 $30,000 
San Felipe Casino Hollywood, San Felipe, NM (T) $0 $1,000 $1,000 
San Manuel Tribal Administration, Highland, CA (T) $0 $32,500 $32,50) 
Santa Fe Racing, Inc., Santa Fe, NM (C) $0 $2,000 $2,000 
Sault Sainte Marie Tribe of Chippewa, Sault Sainte Marie, 
MI (T) $20,000 $130,000 $150,000 
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux, Prior Lake, MN (T) $0 $75,000 $75,000 
Silverado Casino & Restaurant, Fernley, NV (C) $500 $0 $500 
Sodak Gaming, Inc., Rapid City, SO (C) $0 $10,000 $10,000 
Spa Hotel & Casino, Palm Springs, CA (T) $0 $5,000 $5,OCI) 
Spotlight 29 Casino, Coachella, CA (T) $250 $0 $2: l 
St. Croix Tribal Council, Hertel, WI (T) $0 $35,000 $35,OCJ 
Station Casinos, Las Vegas (C) $5,000 $34,500 $39,500 
Table Mountain Casino, Friant, CA (T) $0 $35,000 $35,000 
Tracinda Corp., las Vegas (C) $120,000 $0 $120,000 
Tropicana Resort & Casino, las Vegas (C) $0 $1,000 $1,000 
Trump Casino Resorts, Atlantic City (C) $251,000 $27,500 $278,500 
Tulalip Tribes, Marysville, WA (T) $0 $36,750 $36,750 
Turfway Park Racing Association, Florence, KY (C) $0 $22,500 $22,500 
Viejas Indian Reservation, Alpine, CA (T) $0 $12,500 $12,500 
White Mountain Apache Tribe, White River, AZ (T) . $0 $5,000 $5,000 
SOURCE: Federal Election Commission data, as compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics 
and the National Coalition Against legalized Gambling (1997). 
NOTE: UeC)" stands for ucommercial"; u(T)," for 'ribal." 
raised concerns that governments 
were advertising to adults and chil-
dren that gambling would "obviate 
the need for a solid education" (Yep-
sen 1995) and that governments were . 
becoming "economic predators" of 
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their own citizenry (Van der Slik 
1990). 
THE COSTS OF ORGANIZED 
GAMBLING TO TAXPAYERS 
The socioeconomic costs to the tax-
payers of government-sponsored 
gambling have been conservatively 
estimated at $3 in increased crime 
and social costs for every $1 in new 
tax revenues to governments (U.S. 
House 1994, 77-78; Florida Gover-
nor's Office 1994, 79). Some of these 
socioeconomic costs are indirectly 
and directly attributable to the poli-
cies of the government-gambling alli-
ance that encourage the creation of 
new probable pathological and prob-
lem gamblers. Pursuant to the 
American Psychiatric Association, 
pathological gambling is a recognized 
addictive behavior and is listed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (American Psychi-
atric Association 1994,615-18). 
During the 1990s, there were dra-
matic confirmations of the increases 
in the number of pathological and 
problem gamblers predicted to occur 
as governments began legalizing and 
sponsoring increased gambling ac-
tivities. Even the Nevada press noted 
the significance of "before and after" 
studies in Iowa. In an extensive arti-
cle, the Reno Gazette-Journal ob-
served that Iowa "has had two stud-
ies: in 1989, before riverboat casinos 
were legalized, and in 1995, four 
years after those casinos opened" and 
that the pathological and .problem 
gambling rate increased from 1.7 per-
cent of the population in 1989 to 5.4 
percent in 1995-an alarming in-
crease of over 200 percent (Iowa De-
partment 1995). By comparison, "in 
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New York state, the rate jumped from 
4.2 percent in 1986 to ... 7.3 percent 
in 1995" (Nevada Problem, 1996). 
Furthermore, by 1996, the Nevada 
rate was 8 percent, according to a 
study from the University of Nevada 
at Las Vegas (Preston 1996). In 1994, 
the American Medical Association 
calculated that the sociomedical costs 
of pathological gamblers to U.S. soci-
ety were already at $40 billion, and it 
noted that these problems were in-
creasing (American Medical Associa-
tion 1994). 
The consequences of 
industry dominance 
of the political process 
Political-economic history demon-
strates that any industry or combina-
tion of industries powerful enough to 
dominate an economy will destabilize 
that economy and usually precipitate 
a boom and bust economic cycle with 
a probable "speculative bubble." Dur-
ing 1994, P .S. patrons of legalized 
gambling wagered more than the "en-
tire gross national product of China," 
which caused concern in the U.S. 
Congress (LaFalce 1996, HI678). As 
the twenty-first century was about to 
begin, U.S. policymakers wondered if 
the U.S. legalized gambling industry 
was poised for such domination. 
The South Seas Bubble and the 
Mississippi Bubble constituted two 
classic examples of industries even-
tually dominating national govern-
mental policies, and these scenarios 
resulted in financial disasters that 
threatened to bankrupt entire coun-
tries, including France and the 
United Kingdom. Both of these eco-
nomic scenarios demonstrated "boom 
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and bust" situations, which were 
compounded by "speculative bub-
bles" (Samuelson and Nordhaus 
1992, 204; Samuelson 1976, 422-28). 
Organized gambling and crime 
Arguably, gambling activities 
match the classic historical example 
of an economic process that transfers 
wealth so rapidly and that has such 
a destabilizing potential that govern-
ments have suppressed and criminal-
ized most gambling activities. When 
governments legalize gambling ac-
tivities, those activities must, by eco-
nomic necessity, be limited in scope 
and highly regulated with emphasis 
on ethics legislation to control crime 
and corruption. 
Beginning in the 1980s with the 
U.S. Supreme Court's case of Califor-
nia v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi-
ans (480 U.S. 202 [1987]), legalized 
gambling activities mushroomed in 
the United States. The Court was 
criticized for focusing on a misplaced 
sense of social restructuring for a spe-
cial interest group (Bilezerian 1995) 
instead of properly focusing on the 
interdisciplinary ramifications for 
commerce and legal policy (Kindt 
1995, 569n. 20) of the Court's de facto 
promoting, and indirectly mandat-
ing, the spread of gambling through-
out the United States. ,-
Faced with the Cabazon decision, 
the U.S. Congress passed legislation 
heavily influenced and even drafted 
by gambling interests, the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. This 
legislation provided the appearance . 
of regulation de jure, but there was 
little or no actual regulation. Not oruy 
exempt from state and federal taxes 
but also exempt from most federal 
regulations, such as those relating to 
discrimination, equal employment 
opportunities, and sexual harass-
ment, Indian gambling was uncon-
trolled by 1993. Charged with over-
seeing Indian gambling activities, 
the Department of the Interior, in its 
own internal audit, identified many 
legal violations and serious regula-
tory problems. 
[The] review identified 37 [of 117 Indian] 
gaming operations ... [that] were operat-
ing in apparent violation of the Act. Also 
18 management contracts required . . . 
excessive fees totaling $52.2 million .... 
In addition, 13 leasing contracts existed 
for video gaming equipment that could 
have been purchased for $3.2 million but 
which instead was leased for $40.3 mil-
lion. [Moreover,] . . . from 1988 through 
1992, the U.S. Attorney ... identified sev-
eral instances where tribes involved in 
gaming operations lost approximately 
$500,000 through theft and embezzle-
ment. (U.S. Department of the Interior 
1993,4) 
By 1996, this situation had further 
deteriorated. The National Indian 
Gaming Commission (NIGC), which 
was charged with overseeing Indian 
gambling and whose duties supple-
mented and paralleled those of the 
Department of the Interior, reported 
that 84 percent of Indian gambling 
activities were in "non-compliance"; 
that is, 84 percent of the gambling 
activities were violating federal regu-
lations (National Indian Gaming 
Commission 1996). The NIGC was so 
embarrassed by the results that the 
report's readers were left to do the 
calculations themselves. Protests 
from U.S. senators regarding NIGC 
irrelrularities and imnl"tlnnAtiAA Al-
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legedly resulted in the 1994-96 NIGC 
chair's resignation on 31 January 
1997. Overshadowing this entire 
situation and intensifying the criti-
cisms were $1.43 million in federal 
campaign contributions by Native 
American groups during the 1995-96 
election cycle (Hom 1997b, 1) (see 
Table 2). Some of these contributions 
were allegedly raised via White 
House teas while President Clinton's 
appointments to the investigatory 
gambling commission were not just 
pending but overdue. 
Non-Indian gambling oversight, 
however, was similarly inadequate. 
This determination was confirmed 
during a 1994 hearing before the U.S. 
House of Representatives Committee 
on Small Business and subsequently 
in 1995 before the Committee on the 
Judiciary (U.S. House 1994, 1995). 
Under the dominant influence of leg-
islation proposed and even drafted by 
the gambling interests, during the 
1980s and 1990s states not only le-
galized gambling activities but also 
legislated special economic and li-
ability protections for the gambling 
industry that were unavailable to 
other businesses. Furthermore, only 
New Jersey had any significant eth-
ics legislation controlling contribu-
tions from gambling interests to poli-
ticians and their campaigns. From 
the perspectives of social welfare and 
public policy, there were virtually no 
regulations controlling industry 
abuses. 
Most important for economists 
and governmental decision makers, 
there were no strategic economic con-
trols to prevent the precipitate for-
mation of a classic boom and bust 
economic cycle. A compounded eco-
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nomic threat would also occur if a 
regular cyclical economic downturn 
was coupled with the strategic eco-
nomic impacts of the inherently re-
cessionary U.S. gambling industry. 
In such a scenario, the U.S. economy 
could suffer double jeopardy (U.S. 
House 1994, 73). 
GAMBLING AND POLITICS: 
QUESTIONS OF ETHICS 
Contrary to what the public might 
have expected, the so-called religious 
influence has been largely silent and 
unorganized, whereas the internal, 
supposedly leaked public relations 
strategy documents of three major 
casino companies have revealed that 
the gambling industry is prepared to 
spin any moral debate either way to 
fulfill industry agendas (Better Gov-
ernment Association 1992). While 
most of the denominations and sects 
in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam 
have strictures against gambling, the 
modem debate did not generally fo-
cus on issues involving morality but, 
instead, metamorphosed largely into 
traditional questions involving busi-
ness, legal, and governmental ethics, 
such as questions involving conflicts 
of interest. In this context, the lobby-
ing techniques utilized by the gam-
bling industry to prevent passage of 
the 1996 gambling act and then the 
subsequent industry stacking of the 
gambling commission's membership 
combined to decimate the public im-
age of the industry and particularly 
its main lobbying arm, the American 
Gaming Association, which descend-
ed into an ethical shadow (Wolf 1996, 
H3622-23). 
With the gambling industry lack-
ing general public support, the con-
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siderable lobbying and campaign 
funds available to the industry have 
maneuvered legalized gambling into 
most jurisdictions without a vote of 
the citizenry (Rose 1996). On those 
occasions when gambling interests 
could not bring gambling into an area 
without a vote, the voters were sim-
ply not allowed to reject the gambling 
proposal and gambling interests 
staged multiple revotes. On a state-
wide level, it took 1.5 years of multi-
ple revotes, but when pro-gambling 
interests promised more money to 
education, then "after three tries, 
full-blown riverboat gambling in Mis-
souri became a reality as voters ap-
proved the 'games of chance' amend-
ment 54 to 46 percent" (Ganey and 
Schlinkmann 1994). In a local exam-
ple, a proposal for a gambling river-
boat in Parkville, Missouri, was re-
jected by voters three times within 
less than 2 years before it finally 
passed in a fourth referendum by 75 
votes (Graham 1994). 
Another procedural mechanism to 
promote gambling legislation while 
bypassing the electorate was used in 
Illinois, where multiple so-called 
shell bills-without statutory 
language-were periodically used to 
avoid legislative hearings, expert 
analysis, media scrutiny, and public 
attention. From 1992 to 1996, 84 per-
cent of Illinois voters in local refer-
enda had, in fact, voted in favor of the 
right to vote, before expanding gam-
bling in Illinois, and 58 percent of 
Illinois voters rejected specific gam-
bling proposals while pro-gambling 
interests won only 2 of 39 local votes 
(Bedell 1997). 
Because it was realized that the 
Illinois electorate was overwhelm-
ingly against pro-gambling initia-
tives, any statewide right-to-vote 
bills on expanded gambling were con-
stantly killed in procedural legisla-
tive maneuvers to avoid the public 
attention afforded recorded votes in 
the state Senate and House. This leg-
islative stonewalling strategy was se-
verely criticized by several watchdog 
citizen groups, including the Chicago 
Crime Commission, IDinois Common 
Cause, the Public Welfare Coalition, 
and IDinois Church Action on Alcohol 
Problems. According to Anita Bedell, 
the director of the last of the afore-
mentioned groups, there was a sacri-
fice of the public interest to gambling 
interests (McKinney 1996, 1.0). 
MORAL OPPOSITION: 
A PAPER TIGER? 
The NCALG, a nonprofit organiza-
tion, represents a broad-based coali-
tion, which crosses the entire politi-
cal spectrum and includes all belief 
systems, including Christian, Jew-
ish, and Muslim groups. It provides 
the focal point of opposition to organ-
ized gambling and to the expansion 
oflegalized gaming. The AGNs chair-
man, Frank Fahrenkopf, in address-
ing gambling industry leaders, has 
constantly extolled the political clout 
of the "moral opponents" of gambling 
and linked the NCALG to the Chris-
tian Coalition in an effort to raise 
millions of dollars for the AGA(which 
has approximately a $4.6 million 
budget, compared to just over 
$100,000 for the NCALG). While the 
Christian Coalition may have pro-
vided the NCALG with some limited 
ideological support, the Christian 
Coalition never . made any donations 
or provided any formal support to the 
• 
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NCALG. The power of the NCALG 
and the apparent connection with the 
Christian Coalition were projected by 
the gaming industry as more signifi-
cant than they actually were. One 
gaming article noted, "Religious-
based groups have gaming on the 
run. What can the industry do about 
it?" Furthermore, while the trade 
magazine's article bemoaned "those 
deadly sins," it recognized that "the 
gaming industry . . . [had] been its 
own worst enemy" and criticized the 
industry's "questionable political 
strategy, broken economic promises, 
[and] industry scandals" (Doocey 
1995, 1, 44). 
While the AGA continued to dis-
credit any opposition as morally 
based, the NCALG's executive direc-
tor, 'Ibm Grey, argued primarily on 
the basis of the socioeconomic and 
crime costs associated with gambling 
(Grey 1997). Armed with the latest 
socioeconomic facts, adherents of the 
NCALG's philosophy were usually 
successful by merely informing the 
public of the increased crime, patho-
logical gambling, and other social 
negatives associated with legalized 
gambling activities. 
The moral arguments were ad-
dressed and largely dispelled during 
the congressional debates on H.R. 
497 (and its companion bill, S. 704), 
known as the National Gambling Im-
pact Study Commission Act. 
Gambling interests also criticize this leg-
islation as Ule moral musings of the relig-
ious community. Supporters of H.R. 497 
include: 47 Republican and 23 Democrat 
[U.S. Representatives], many states' at-
torneys general, governors, and newspa-
pers such as The Washington Post and 
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The Cincinnati Enquirer. This is a bipar-
tisan, non-ideological coalition joined be-
cause of their concern about the impact of 
gambling. (U.S. House 1995, 19) 
Regardless of these considerations, 
the social and political trends after 
the mid-1990s had shifted against 
blanket public acceptance of the ex-
pansion of legalized gambling activi-
ties. Simply by disseminating infor-
mation, the NCALG leadership could 
be largely credited with reversing the 
trends of the 1980s and early 1990s, 
which had been toward the increased 
expansion of legalized gambling ac-
tivities. 
By 1997, these political-societal 
problems had intensified beyond iso-
lated abuses by the gambling indus-
try to become a pattern of coordi-
nated abuse. The debate had also 
metamorphosed from a debate over 
the "extent" of the economic cancer to 
be tolerated from organized gam-
bling, to a debate on whether the 
public would tolerate any such 
economic cancer at all (Rose 1996; 
Goodman 1994). 
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